The opinion stated: “[T]his court notes . 721 (1993) A handwritten document in the prosecution’s file stated that the Church of Christ “doesn’t take a stand on [the] Death Penalty.” App. The State responds that Duncan and Graves were not similar to Hood because Hood’s son had been convicted of theft, while Graves’s and Duncan’s sons had not. assess Foster’s intellectual state.26 The jury determined that Foster did not meet the standard for exclusion, and the habeas case resumed in Butts County.27 In 2006, Foster’s counsel obtained the prosecution’s 15. , when they struck all black prospective jurors before his trial. And though the State gave other facially reasonable justifications for striking Garrett, those are difficult to credit because of the State’s willingness to accept white jurors with the same characteristics. Petitioners were convicted following a California state criminal trial during which the prosecutor, as then permitted by a state constitutional provision, extensively … Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court. And even when a state prisoner’s second or successive federal habeas petition asserts a new federal constitutional claim based on what is asserted to be new evidence, the claim must be dismissed unless a very demanding test is met. Larry Chisolm, District Attorney, Cecelia Harris, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. 35. by the Court here, to theft by taking on April 4th, 1982. . Lanier’s misrepresentations to the trial court began with an elaborate explanation of how he ultimately came to strike Garrett: “[T]he prosecution considered this juror [to have] the most potential to choose from out of the four remaining blacks in the 42 [member] panel venire. Trial Record 446. The trial court rejected that claim, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. . The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, 258 Ga., at 747, 374 S. E. 2d, at 197, and we denied certiorari, Foster v. Georgia, May 24, 2016 “Implausible,” “fantastical,” “intricate,” and “nonsense.” This is how Justice Roberts described the myriad explanations given by Georgia for the state’s peremptory challenges of black jurors in Timothy Foster’s 1987 trial. Syllabus. . (Thomas, J., dissenting). The State argues that it “was actively seeking a black juror.” Brief for Respondent 12; see also App. Id., at 86–87. BATSON 55 bias.” 14. Since the petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was appealing the Georgia Supreme Court's order, it was unclear whether the order "rests on an adequate and independent state law ground," which would preclude the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisdiction over Foster's federal claim. About a month after the murder, police officers were called to respond to a local disturbance. 555 (1940) Rather, it appears that the Superior Court understood state law to permit Foster to obtain reconsideration of his previously rejected Batson claim only if he was able to show that a “change in the facts” was “sufficient to overcome the res judicata bar.” App. See also S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T. Bishop, E. Hartnett, & D. Himmelfarb, Supreme Court Practice 212 (10th ed. On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court is bound to accept that evaluation of the federal question, but whether that conclusion justifies relief under state res judicata law is a matter for that court to decide. The record evidence shows that Garrett was one of those “ten specific people.”. The new evidence, moreover, supports the prosecution’s concern about Hood’s views on capital punishment. We have “decline[d] . Many of the State’s secondary justifications similarly come undone when subjected to scrutiny. To begin, it “reeks of afterthought,” Miller-El, 545 U. S., at 246, having never before been made in the nearly 30-year history of this litigation: not in the trial court, not in the state habeas court, and not even in the State’s brief in opposition to Foster’s petition for certiorari. challenge to be sustained if there is a reasonable probability that race was a factor in the exercise of the peremptory or where the judge finds it is more likely than not that, but for the defendant’s race, the peremptory would not have … . [3][4], During jury selection, the prosecutors used peremptory strikes to remove all four black prospective jurors from the jury pool, resulting in an all-white jury. In this case, the Georgia habeas court’s analysis in the section of its opinion labeled “Batson claim” proceeded as follows: “The [State] argues that this claim is not reviewable due to the doctrine of res judicata. App. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). . But that is not all. If an adequate and independent state-law ground bars Foster’s claim, then the Court today has done nothing more than issue an impermissible advisory opinion. Neither does. We have no quarrel with the State’s general assertion that it “could not trust someone who gave materially untruthful answers on voir dire.” Foster, 258 Ga., at 739, 374 S. E. 2d, at 192. Much of his speaking time was spent answering these procedural questions. After the Georgia Supreme Court rejected Foster’s Batson argument on direct appeal, he filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court, but his petition did not raise a Batson claim,[1] and the petition was denied. 476 U. S. 79 I would think that this state-law defect in Foster’s state habeas petition would be the end of the matter: “Because this Court has no power to review a state law determination that is sufficient to support the judgment, resolution of any independent federal ground for the decision could not affect the judgment and would therefore be advisory.” Coleman v. Thompson, Annotations denoted those individuals as “B#1,” “B#2,” and “B#3,” respectively. [5] A prosecutor is entitled to disbelieve a juror’s voir dire answers, of course. rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had,” §1257—raises such a question. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, first holding that it had jurisdiction to review the denial of a Certificate of Probable Cause; there was no indication that denial rested on state law “independent of the merits” of Foster’s Batson claim. This Court, no less than every other federal court, has “an independent obligation to ensure that [we] do not exceed the scope of [our] jurisdiction, and therefore [we] must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook or elect not to press.” Henderson v. Shinseki, . But he declined to strike three out of the four prospective white jurors who were also divorced. App. See ante, at 7–8. 192. App. All were black. 365 U.S. 610 . 152 (1984) . (“Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, . BY: LAUREN MADDOX In 1986, the Supreme Court decided Batson v. Kentucky, holding that use of peremptory challenges to remove jurors from the jury pool based on race is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Both veniremen Hood and Garrett appeared on the “definite NO’s” list. . (2) A draft of an affidavit that had been prepared by Lundy “at Lanier’s request” for submission to the state trial court in response to Foster’s motion for a new trial. That text had been crossed out by hand; the version of the affidavit filed with the trial court did not contain the crossed-out language. This is solely my opinion. I cannot go along with that “sort of sandbagging of state courts.” Miller-El v. Dretke, analysis,” in which it evaluated the original trial record and habeas record, including the newly uncovered prosecution file. “[Duncan]: No. Pp. This case presents such a circumstance. In response, the State disclosed documents related to the jury selection at that trial. Ante, at 7–8. With respect to Garrett and Hood, such evidence is compelling. P. 23. September 28, 2010. And if that is what the State Supreme Court held, the rule that the court applied was an amalgam of state and federal law. Tag Archives: Foster v. Chatman. Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. ___ (2016), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the state law doctrine of res judicata does not preclude a Batson challenge against peremptory challenges if new evidence has emerged. Among other documents, the file contained (1) copies of the jury venire list on which the names of each black prospective juror were highlighted in bright green, with a legend indicating that the highlighting “represents Blacks”; (2) a draft affidavit from an investigator comparing black prospective jurors and concluding, “If it comes down to having to pick one of the black jurors, [this one] might be okay”; (3) notes identifying black prospective jurors as “B#1,” “B#2,” and “B#3”; (4) notes with “N” (for “no”) appearing next to the names of all black prospective jurors; (5) a list titled “[D]efinite NO’s” containing six names, including the names of all of the qualified black prospective jurors; (6) a document with notes on the Church of Christ that was annotated “NO. 56 (pretrial hearing). Justice Alito wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment to describe the state law on the matter, while Justice Thomas dissented. A fortiori, when a State’s highest court has denied relief without any explanation, the proper course is to vacate and remand for clarification before reaching the merits of a federal question that might have nothing to do with the state court’s decision. (“[T]he ten people that we felt very uncomfortable with, we have to know up front.” (Lanier testimony)). “It is ironic that his son, . 175. 490 U. S. 1085 (1989) App. . 260 (1989) 476 U. S. 79 Welch v. United States, ante, at 15 (Thomas, J., dissenting). She denied any knowledge of the area.” Trial Record 439 (brief in opposition to new trial). 110–111 (new trial hearing; emphasis added). Ct. Floyd Cty., Ga., 1987), p. 1152 (hereinafter Trial Transcript); see also id., at 1153–1158. that the following claims are not reviewable based on the doctrine of res judicata, as the claims were raised and litigated adversely to the petitioner on his direct appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court.” App. Foster subsequently sought review of the Superior Court’s decision in the Georgia Supreme Court, but that court refused to issue a certificate of probable cause (CPC) to appeal. Oklahoma.[1]. [8] The Georgia Supreme Court denied a "Certificate of Probable Cause" necessary, under state law, to appeal the habeas decision, determining that the case had no "arguable merit"[9] The Georgia Supreme Court's decision in its entirety said: "Upon the consideration of the Application for Certificate of Probable Cause to appeal the denial of habeas corpus, it is ordered that it be hereby denied. , the Court reasons that “the state habeas court’s application of res judicata to Foster’s Batson claim was not independent of the merits of his federal constitutional challenge.” Ante, at 8. Darrell Hood[,] has been sentenced . Davis recognizes the principle that one who had an issue decided adversely to him on direct appeal is precluded from relitigating that issue on habeas corpus”); Gunter v. Hickman, 256 Ga. 315, 316, 348 S. E. 2d 644, 645 (1986) (“This issue was actually litigated, i.e., raised and decided, in the appellant’s direct appeal . Our decision in Batson v. Kentucky, As we explained in Miller-El v. Dretke, “[i]f a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack [panelist] who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination.” See, e.g., Roulain v. Martin, 266 Ga. 353, 466 S. E. 2d 837, 839 (1996) (“Since this issue was raised and resolved in Martin’s direct appeal, it should not have been readdressed by the habeas court”); Davis v. Thomas, 261 Ga. 687, 689, 410 S. E. 2d 110, 112 (1991) (“This issue was raised on direct appeal, and this court determined that it had no merit. The State concedes that either Lanier or Pullen compiled the list, which Lundy testified was “used for preparation in jury selection.” Tr. The Court today imposes an opinion-writing requirement on the States’ highest courts. (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of stay of execution); Huffman v. Florida, A: Yes, sir. The complainant, Lisa Stubbs, told them that her boyfriend, petitioner Timothy Foster, had killed White and had distributed the goods stolen from White’s home to Stubbs and family members. Respondents, who were housed in the same cell in an Ohio maximum security prison, brought a class action in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. 55 (pretrial hearing). . On the morning of August 28, 1986, police found Queen Madge White dead on the floor of her home in Rome, Georgia. No.192. Later in its opinion, the Superior Court again referred to the Batson claim and wrote as follows: “The Respondent argues that this claim is not reviewable due to the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court rejected an argument that the strikes were racially motivated, in violation of Batson v. Kentucky. That was not true. , provides a three-step process for determining when a strike is discriminatory: “First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race; second, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question; and third, in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.” Snyder, 552 U. S., at 476–477 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). While his state habeas petition was pending, Foster obtained copies of the prosecution’s trial file, including the jury venire list with the names of each black prospective juror highlighted; an investigator's statement comparing black prospective jurors and concluding, “If it comes down to having to pick one of the black jurors, [this one] might be okay”; notes with “N” (for “no”) appearing next to the names of all black prospective jurors; a document with notes about a church, annotated "No. The Court’s analysis with respect to Hood is unavailing. The State argues that “because [Foster] did not call either of the prosecutors to the stand” to testify in his state habeas proceedings, “he can only speculate as to the meaning of various markings and writings” on thosepages, “the author of many of them, and whether the twoprosecutors at trial (District Attorney Lanier and Assistant District Attorney Pullen) even saw many of them.” Brief for Respondent 20. I did not instruct anyone to make the green highlighted marks. . The most we can glean, therefore, from the summary denial of Foster’s state habeas petition is that the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that Foster’s claim lacked “arguable merit.”. 507 U. S. 680, . In 1986, Timothy Tyrone Foster, an 18-year-old black man, was charged with murdering Queen White, an elderly white woman. When the prosecution asked Hood if Foster’sage would be a factor for him in sentencing, he answered “None whatsoever.” Trial Transcript 280. See, e.g., Sears v. Humphrey, 294 Ga. 117, 117–118, 751 S. E. 2d 365, 368 (2013); Hillman v. Johnson, 297 Ga. 609, 611, 615, n. 5, 774 S. E. 2d 615, 617, 620, n. 5 (2015). NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. I therefore refuse to presume that the unexplained denial of relief by the Supreme Court of Georgia presents a federal question.[2]. In July 1989, Foster filed a state habeas petition in the Superior Court of Butts County, Georgia. In response to a question by Chief Justice Roberts, Bright pointed out that, despite the prosecution claiming they struck the black prospective jurors because they were women, the prosecution accepted other non-black women onto the jury. Ibid. "[20] Justice Thomas notes that historically the Supreme Court would vacate and remand for clarification before proceeding to the merits of a case like this and "refuse[d] to presume that the unexplained denial of relief by the Supreme Court of Georgia presents a federal question. . The process worked as follows: The clerk of the court called the qualified prospective jurors one by one, and the State had the option to exercise one of its peremptory strikes. The far more likely explanation for the court’s denial of habeas relief is that Foster’s claim is procedurally barred. 476 U. S. 79 (1986) to review the federal questions asserted to be present” when “ ‘there is considerable uncertainty as to the precise grounds for the [state court’s] decision.’ ” Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 246. 467 U. S. 138 Ante, at 7–8. 11–17. But here, when the decision is a one-line judgment, it hardly makes sense to invoke the Long presumption. View Case; Cited Cases; Citing Case ; 136 S.Ct. It was the trial court that observed the veniremen firsthand and heard them answer the prosecution’s questions, and its evaluation of the prosecution’s credibility on this point is certainly far better than this Court’s nearly 30 years later. Accordingly, Ake does not mean that we can simply disregard the possibility that the decision under review may have a state-law component. The Long presumption assumes that the ambiguous state-court ruling will come in the form of a reasoned decision: It applies in cases in which “it is not clear from the opinion itself that the state court relied upon an adequate and independent state ground and when it fairly appears that the state court rested its decision primarily on federal law.” Id., at 1042 (emphasis added). Foster v. Sitel Operating Corporation Plaintiff: Marquise Foster: Defendant: Sitel Operating Corporation: Case Number: 3:2019cv00148: Filed: February 15, 2019: Court: US District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee: Office: Nashville Office: Presiding Judge: Jeffery S Frensley: Referring Judge: Eli J Richardson: Nature of Suit: Labor: Fair Standards: Cause of Action: … The State attempts to explain away the contradiction between the “definite NO’s” list and Lanier’s statements to the trial court as an example of a prosecutor merely “misspeak[ing].” Brief for Respondent 51. Duncan gave practically the same answer as Garrett did during voir dire: “[Court]: Are you familiar with the neighborhood in which [the victim] live[d]? But the predicate for the State’s account—that Garrett was “listed” by the prosecution as “questionable,” making that strike a last-minute race-neutral decision—was false. The Court also second-guesses the prosecution’s strike of Hood because of his questionable stance on the death penalty. Officers arrested Foster, who confessed to the murder and robbery, 258 Ga., at 736, 374 S. E. 2d, at 190, and the police recovered some of the stolen goods. 1038 (1983) Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. . The prosecution’s second principal justification for striking Hood—his affiliation with the Church of Christ, and that church’s alleged teachings on the death penalty—fares no better. These notes showed that someone had highlighted the names of black jurors and had written the letter “B” next to their names. As a threshold matter, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the lower court's habeas decision was not independent of federal issues and therefore does not bar review by the U.S. Supreme Court. That argument, having never before been raised in the 30 years since Foster’s trial, “reeks of afterthought.”. The trial court and the Georgia Supreme Court rejected Foster’s Batson claim. 14–8349. 357, and many cases decided since, a person traveling by railroad as a caretaker of livestock on a "free" or "drover's" … The trial court then conducted a juror-by-juror voir dire of approximately 90 prospective jurors. 470 U. S. 68, [22], Justice Alito's opinion concurring in the judgment, an adequate and independent state law ground, Argument analysis: To decide, or not — that is the question, Opinion analysis: Telltale files on race-based jury selection, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Foster_v._Chatman&oldid=895897661, United States Supreme Court cases of the Roberts Court, Short description is different from Wikidata, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License, The Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court denying Foster a Certificate of Probable Cause on his, Roberts, joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan. Hood asserted no fewer than four times during voir dire that he could impose the death penalty. 9–10. 175. Lanier then compared Blackmon to Garrett. Specifically, Lanier objected to Garrett because she: (1) worked with disadvantaged youth in her job as a teacher’s aide; (2) kept looking at the ground during voir dire; (3) gave short and curt answers during voir dire; (4) appeared nervous; (5) was too young; (6) misrepresented her familiarity with the location of the crime; (7) failedto disclose that her cousin had been arrested on a drug charge; (8) was divorced; (9) had two children and two jobs; (10) was asked few questions by the defense; and (11) did not ask to be excused from jury service. After sentencing, Foster filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the jury selection violated the US Supreme Court's Batson decision. Id., at 83 (pretrial hearing); accord, ibid. Thus, the court held that the Batson claim was “without merit.” App. Foster v. Chatman Ruling Reverses Death Sentence on the Basis of Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection Chatman Ruling Reverses Death Sentence on the Basis of Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection 24 May 2016, 12:27 pm by James Clark Question: Add details. When “a state court’s interpretation of state law has been influenced by an accompanying interpretation of federal law,” the proper course is for this Court to “revie[w] the federal question on which the state-law determination appears to have been premised. To determine whether Foster had alleged a sufficient “change in the facts,” the habeas court engaged in four pages of what it termed a “Batson .

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